Abstract: This paper considers the "inventory outsourcing problem" as a VaR (Value at Risk) problem providing a mechanism for managing outsourcing firms when the supplier is a leader having full information of the outsourcing firm's demand distributions and cost parameters. This leads to a Stackleberg game which is solved under a number of assumptions. Both demand dependent and independent models are considered, the latter resulting from (statistical) risk aggregation. A number of examples are solved as well to highlight essential issues underlying the practice of inventory outsourcing-price and supply priorities. These solutions can be be expressed as nonlinear optimization problems which can be solved by standard numerical routines.
INTRODUCTION
Outsourcing consists in the transfer of previously inhouse activities to a third party (Gattorna, 1988; La Londe and Cooper, 1989; Razzaque and Sheng, 1998) . Inventory outsourcing in a supply chain, in particular, arises from three essential motivations: economies of scale, risk and focus (Rao and Young, 1994; van Damme and Ploos van Amstel, 1996; McIvor, 2000) . These motivations presume that economic advantage arises from collaboration and exchange between firms, leading to firm's restructuring along supply chains organizations and operations (Bowersox, 1990; Skjoett-Larsen, 2000; van Laarhoven, Berglund and Peters, 2000) .
A typical example would be the practice to focus on a JIT (Just in Time) manufacturing strategy and outsource the management of inventories to a carefully selected supplier (for example, see Crawford et al. 1988 , Grout and Christy, 1992 , Celley et al. 1987 .
This practice raises a number of issues however, spanning: A bounded rationality due to limits in information available to the supplier that may lead to excess shortages; A potential for opportunistic behavior by the supplier and the firm alike, as well as problems associated to small numbers bargaining and information asymmetry leading to moral hazard and to adverse selection.
In some cases, several firms acting on the same market might outsource to a common supplier, augmenting significantly the demand volatility faced by the supplier (and thereby augmenting costs). As a result the inventory outsourcing decision as well as the management of supplies are not always worthwhile, involving risks to the outsourcing firm. In order for such decisions to be economic, they require a careful synchronization of orders and supplies as well as a clear statement regarding the supply contracts (such as minimum supply guarantees), emergency supply options and setting priorities by the supplier to minimize clients supply risks and maximize profits as well.
In practice, outsourcing risks includes the risks of outsourcing critical inventories activities and ex-ante and ex-post dependency on suppliers. Additional factors such as supply delays and preferential supplier-firms relationships that cannot be met for one reason or another compound the risks of outsourcing.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the problem of "inventory outsourcing" from a risk perspective using a Value at Risk approach widely applied in finance. Such an approach has the advantage of expressing outsourcing firms risk specifications in a unified and fiancial-money manner and still be coherent with traditional approaches to inventory management (based on cost minimization).
The problem of inventory outsourcing is then set as an inventory game where the firm or the supplier can act as a leader or follower (Stackleberg 1952 , see also Tapiero, 2000 Tapiero, , 2004 . When the supplier is a leader and outsourcing firms followers, the supplier selects a supply policy which is consistent with (outsourcing) the outsourcing firms objectives optimization. And vice versa, when the outsourcing firm is a leader it uses the supplier objective optimization to reach its decision to outsource. For simplicity however only the case of a supplier "leader" is considered and some implications for the outsourcing process are derived.
The practical value of the approach presented in this paper arises however from our transforming the risk associated to the inventory policy into a specific financial-risk which can be optimized conjointly with firms (suppliers and outsourcing) objective function. Such an approach can contribute to a better communication between financial and operational managers in selecting strategic inventory outsourcing and supply policies. The inventory costs for each of the firms j are thus random and defined by:
where m p is the current market price of buying the product (or a part that might be needed in a production process),
An optimal ordering policy based on expected costs minimization for each of the firms yields an optimal quantile risk that each firm will use in its deterining the order quantity if it were to self-manage inventories: function of a number of factors we shall see subsequently. The missing supply quantity is bought through an "emergency" supplier at a premium price.
The quantity bought is ( )
premium paid for just in time delivery by the "emergency" supplier. The cost differences are thus:
Where firms' optimal order quantities are:
The decision to outsource inventories is thus based on the supply risk that managers are willing to sustain (necessarily smaller than the supply risk sustained if they were to self managed their inventories). If this risk is stated as a cost growth percentage risk β in case the firm does decided not to outsource, then:
The term j C β % is therefore cost for risk exposure"
that the inventory manager is willing to sustain. While, j ξ , is the risk probability the firm is willing to assume for costs overruns. Ex-ante these costs are not known however. Thus, an appropriate alternative is to consider the Value of Outsourcing Risk
given by:
is the optimal cost of the inventory manager with an optimal inventory order policy
is then the money quantity that a firm will be willing to risk in an outsourcing decision. This expression can be calculated easily by calculating the mean and the variance of therefore their variance will tend to be larger. As a result, in expectation, there must be benefits to outsourcing to compensate the increased risk.
By the same token, a supplier, a manager of inventories, may be faced with the same types of costs and an aggregate demand. However, due to focusing and economies of scale, the supplier may acquire the goods at a lower price which we denote by which he might partly transfer to firms while reducing the holding and shortage costs given Due to the statistical aggregation of firms demands and the law of large numbers, it is can be assumed in fact that has a normal probability distribution with mean and variance given by:
Of course, when demands are independent or demands are dependent and negatively correlated, the variance will be smaller. However, when demands are dependent and positively correlated, the demand variance faced by the supplier can be much greater, incurring important and additional costs associated to the outsourcing decision by firms. In such situations, the outsourcing firm might sustain too large a risk which it may have been ill prepared (since it did could not the the fupplier's firms hav dependent demands). supplied by an "emergence" and costly supplier. Let be the supplier's order from some manufacturer (alternatively, the supplier can be a manufacturer and is the period production quantity). Then, if we let the supplier be a leader and the outsourcing firms followers, the supplier's problem can be stated as a Stackleberg game where the supplier minimizes expected costs subject to outsourcing firms' optimal ordering policies (implied in their inventory cost minimization). The supplier's expected costs can be measured in a number of manners. Below we consider an example which is reduced to a quadratic programming problem.
An Example:
Let the unit price of an order R be while the selling price is 
is a normal distribution, we have: 
In other words, the larger the quantity delivered, the larger the profit per unit and the higher the shortage cost of the outsourcing firm. Such a decision may be appropriate when demands are independent. However, when demands are dependent, the supplier is likely to violate the risk constraints. In this case, the solution is the following:
and therefore the supplier will have on the average excess inventories. The optimal solution is then:
In other words, aggregate supplier inventory costs can only be reduced by augmenting the selling price to outsourcing firms. In the case of demand dependence, predicted excess inventories will have to be compensated by a higher selling price. When this price exceeds the market price, a strong case for supply chain inventory outsourcing is needed which must be based on arguments other than inventory costs.
Alternatively, a supplier can also use priorities to assure some clients-firms a preferential treatment contracted in terms of minimal deliveries in case supply failure. In such cases, the inventory outsourcing model is slightly more involved and can be solved equally numerically. For example, if firm j has priority over firm k, denoted by a binary variable other preferential agreements and priorities can be worked out and integrated in a supplier's schedule of firms' demands. These priorities might be needed to reduce the costs derived by demand dependence across outsourcing firms. Their analyses will require the application of integer optimization or simulation techniques however.
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CONCLUSION
This paper has considered an "inventory outsourcing problem" when the supplier is a leader having full information of the outsourcing firm's demand distributions and parameters. Cases of dependent and independent demands were considered, providing a practical framework for handling such problems based on both pricing and priority ordering. Extensions and further developments of this paper can be considered emphasizing both the economic risks in supply outsourcing as well as imperfect information related issues between the supplier and the supplied firms, coordination and collaboration.
